The waiting game was played over two years, when endless debates were held clarifying positions, wrestling with procedures that could prejudge the outcome, even trying to understand what this outcome would be, finally giving birth to a « negotiating text ».  But contrary to normal growth, the text first grew and then was pared down to  a « manageable » size.  In Barcelona, in November, the text appeared to take shape.  This spurred developed countries, in particular the EU countries, to intensify their efforts, began even before Bali,  to influence and pressure developing countries which in turn began to show increasing signs of cohesiveness.

In the meanwhile, everybody waited to see which way the US would go.  The whole process was put on slow motion until the new US administration took over early in 2009, and then hope was revived that the US would now engage in the process.  They did, but only to make more noise in the negotiations, dampening hopes for a US target of emissions reductions, promising recycled financing, most of it to be spent domestically, and above all, warning that everything depended on US congressional approval.  This ensured that nothing would happen until mid to late 2010.

The EU was busy spending time and money to divide and influence developing countries.  Bribing where they can, promising the same recycled financing and maybe more to come if countries are amenable, bullying where they cannot bribe. The UK financed workshops in selected vulnerable countries, deploying climate envoys, in particular one on Climate Security for Vulnerable Countries,  who in so many words, told « intransigent » negotiators that they are putting up a group of vulnerable countries in order to pressure the major developing countries into taking on emissions reductions commitments. 

Small « circles of commitment » were formed, the G8 summits came out with double declarations that contained conflicting declarations from the developed countries and a group of « major developing economies », and meetings with selected developing countries, including bilateral ones, were intensively pursued. Significantly, the Danish lead negotiator was suddenly taken ill in the last Bonn meeting, and never showed up again.  Cracks were beginning to show in the conspiracy.

Their efforts partly paid  off, as a couple of these «  vulnerable » countries stoutly defended the Copenhagen Accord which came out of the (Danish design) woodwork in Copenhagen. One even claimed to represent the African Group, whereas it was clear that the African Group was among the most cohesive within the group of 132 developing countries called the Group of 77.

Not all were fooled, however, and Tuvalu, a strong defender among truly vulnerable small island developing countries, likened the Accord’s US$30 billion financing provisions to the biblical « 30 pieces of silver ».

What really occurred in Copenhagen was the culmination of all the frustrations of many developing countries in the total lack of transparency and inclusiveness in the process.

Rumors of a Danish text were circulating weeks before Copenhagen. When confronted with these rumors, the Danish presidency firmly denied the existence of a text. The secretariat also affirmed before a G77 presessional meeting that only one Danish president would be elected « the next day » .  We forgot to ask about the day after that, and indeed two days before the final plenary, a new Danish president was named.  And at the same time, it was announced that Danes would come up with not one, but two texts.  

Before that, at the beginning of the second week, new procedures were introduced that delayed negotiations for at least two days.  The G77 was blamed for these delays, as developed countries stalled at closed negotiating rooms, continually bracketing texts, coming out with new proposals, clarifying former ones, drawing out developing countries anxious to come to textual agreements, with the EU mainly staying quiet, restating positions,  biding for time until the Danes get the high-level officials into a climate « green room » of exclusive negotiations.  

And to the press outside, the message continued to be « the G77 is blocking negotiations. » At the same time, the message was reinforced that the US and China, the US and India, France and Brazil, France and Ethiopia, claiming to  represent Africa, all were agreeing to the « deal » to be sealed in Copenhagen.

At the last minute, after a parody of the Danish presidency of putting up the negotiating groups once again at the insistence of the G77, three main issues were taken out of the negotiators’ hands, the same three issues which resurfaced later in the Copenhagen Accord reflecting EU positions.  These issues were the long-term global goal »,  the controversial market mechanisms and trade discussions, and most of all, financing.
 
We were to have reconvened in a « contact group » setting, to decide whether to have a « friends of the Chair » small meeting with countries selected by the whole, but we never did. The G77 negotiators continued bravely to engage in negotiations, hoping for these to be part of the final agreed outcome.  We waited in vain.

What took place behind closed doors was the backroom wheeling and dealing.  I took part, accidentally, as part of the Sudanese team, in the first meeting, where the big G77 countries were trying to revise the text, with some other developing countries defending the original text.  Small gains were made, but largely the revisions suggested by developing countries were ignored. Sudan dropped out of the final backroom negotiations, by choice, when it became increasingly clear that little more could be accomplished for small developing countries. 

The Accord mainly reflects the EU positions on most issues. In particular, financing is to continue to be channeled to the failed delivery systems of the past, through « international institutions », « public and private, bilateral and multialteral, including alternative sources of finance, « without acknowledging the commitments to provide financial resources under the governance of Parties.  

The final plenary broke out in confusion when the Danish Prime Minister, now Chairman, marched in after making the delegations wait for nearly five hours without any explanation, took the microphone to announce that a deal was done, called the Copenhagen Accord, as secretariat personnel frantically distributed the text, and instructed the rest of the meeting to break out in « regional groups » and to take one hour to come up with their positions. 

He then closed the session precipitately without following normal procedures of soliciting views of Parties and proceeded to march out again when pandemonium broke out as Parties demanded to be heard.  The only way to be given the floor was to ask for points of order, which were not heeded until nameplates were banged on the table. During the interventions, the Chairman looked on, glaring at the proceedings, turning now and then to consult the secretariat. No courtesy nor proper attention were accorded to the speakers which included ministers and ambassadors heading delegations.

The claim that only three or four countries spoke against the Accord and the procedures followed is false, as proven by subsequent interventions, punctuated by applause, from other developing countries or their supporters.  Developed countries and their followers also applauded their own spokesmen, which included in particular two developing countries.

The intervention of Ed Miliband of the UK focused on a threat that the paragraphs concerning financing would not be « operationalized » unless countries signed up to the accord.  This was  followed some time later by the United States which in turn elaborated on what one could get in terms of pledges of financing if one accepted the accord.

Sad to say, pledges of financing have a way of evaporating over time, and financing done through existing institutions are unpredictable, difficult to access, conditional, and selective. Any governance system set up outside of the Convention itself is just another layer of bureaucracy, and equal representation of developed and developing countries outside of the UN system is subject to interpretation.

What happens now ?

The Parties decided to continue with the ongoing process of negotiations, while taking note of the Accord which, on many of its provisions, undermines the developing countries’ positions in these negotiations  The Parties took note of the Accord which would be open to participation by Parties, if they wish to avail of the promised financing, the terms of which are still uncertain.

What mainly happened is the complete breakdown of trust among Parties.  To build it up again, under the shadow of an Accord that would be pursued at all costs, is immensely challenging.  The holidays might provide time for reflection, and the firm resolve of the New Year should be to do something, finally, please, to address climate change and its adverse effects.